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Abstract
In this paper we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyse different aspects of financial reforms in a
two sector closed economy.  Market structure in one of the sectors is perfectly competitive, while the other sector is
monopolistically competitive.  The perfectly competitive firms do not have access to the equity markets, whereas the imperfectly
competitive firms finance their fixed cost needs through the equity market and operate under increasing returns to scale.  Both
types of firms depend on the banks for working capital finance.  Financial reform is modeled as a one shot process of either
increasing the efficiency of the equity market or decreasing the cash-reserve ratio of the banks.  We analyse a steady state
solution of the dynamic structure.  Simulation exercises with alternative plausible parametric specifications regarding capital and
labour intensities in the production process throw light on the issues of brand proliferation (emergence of new firms) and relative
impact on the two sectors, following the initiation of a financial reform programme.
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1.  Introduction
Financial intermediaries have traditionally played a pivotal role in the growth
of the real sector in the development experience of the developed and newly
industrialized countries (Goldsmith 1969, Patrick 1966). The magnitude and
dimensions of this finance-growth nexus have been the focus of a number of
empirical studies.  The level of financial intermediation acts as a good predictor of
long run rates of economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity
improvement in King and Levine (1993); whereas, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995),
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Odedokun (1996, 1998), Arestis and Demetriades
(1997), Wang (2000) among others, attempt to answer the vexed question of which
sector, financial or real, leads in the dynamic process of economic development.  It
has been widely agreed that financial development is crucial for successful economic
growth. In the policy front, the literature arising out of the McKinnon and Shaw
hypothesis (McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973) and its critique (Wijnbergen 1983, Buffie
1986, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Cho 1986) points to the importance of financial
reforms as an integral part of the stabilization and structural reforms programme for
the developing countries.
Financial intermediaries provide the link between the financial and the real
sector and they have been central to both forms of literature cited above.  Fama (1980)
has pointed out that a perfectly competitive financial intermediary has no role to play
in a world without frictions.  To justify the emergence of financial intermediaries
frictions in the form of asset indivisibility and imperfect risk sharing arising out of
informational asymmetries, have been stressed in the literature. Financial
intermediaries perform the roles of resource mobilization and allocation, risk
diversification and liquidity management to foster development of the real sector.  In
a complete information deterministic world also, financial intermediaries can have the
important role of a temporary resource provider when there is a time lag between the
firms' factor payments and receipts from sale proceeds (Edwards and Vegh 1998,
Buffie 1986, Wijnbergen 1983).  This role assumes greater significance when the
firms do not have enough internal resources to cover its factor payments and the
financial intermediaries come in with working capital finance.2
In the process of financial development equity markets across the world have
become another important source of resource mobilization and allocation.  Equity
markets are fast catching up with traditional financial intermediaries in terms of
volume and transactions (Boyd and Smith 1998).  Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Harris
(1994) and Levine and Zervos (1998) present cross-country studies of equity market
development and economic growth to show that they are highly correlated.  Generally
financing through the equity market has been observed to be relatively long term in
nature as compared to the traditional intermediaries.  The penchant for intermediaries
towards short-term loans can be interpreted as a preference towards financing the
variable cost needs of the firms.  On the other hand firms tend to approach the equity
markets to finance their fixed cost needs.  Differentiation along these lines is
consistent with the conclusion of Levine and Zervos that "both stock markets and
banks arise and develop simultaneously while providing different bundles of financial
services to the economy."
Although it seems that in a general equilibrium set up with multiple assets, the
returns from different assets will have to be equalized for their coexistence, in the
theoretical literature coexistence and endogenous development of intermediated
finance and equity finance have been modeled in several ways, even when they offer
different rates of returns.  In the presence of moral hazard, firms without enough
assets are prevented from obtaining funds in the equity market.  These assets can
either be monetary (Holmstrom and Tirole,1993) or reputational (Diamond,1991).
When some firms do not have access to the equity market, they have to fall back upon
traditional intermediaries and the coexistence of banks and stock market arise as an
endogenous outcome of the models.  In a different vein, Boyd and Smith (1998)
justify the coexistence of debt and equity markets in the presence of liquid and illiquid
technologies.  Endogenous financial development is also modeled in Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990) by introducing a "once-and-for-all" lump sum cost of development.
Contrary to this endogenous development view, some economists take the
development of the financial market as exogenous to the model arguing that
"differences in the extent of financial markets across countries seem to depend
primarily on legislation and government regulation."  (Bencivenga and Smith 1991)
On a similar vein, we do not explicitly model endogenous development of financial
markets.  Coexistence is guaranteed by exogenous classification of different forms of3
financing for different types of costs - fixed costs are financed through the equity
market and variable costs are financed by the intermediaries. This kind of
classification also helps us in generating a role for financial intermediaries even in a
deterministic production structure.  There is a definite shift of emphasis from
analyzing the dynamics of the credit channel to the equity market.
The treatment of the product market structure has remained mostly
rudimentary in the financial reform literature.  Most of the models look into the
financing problems of a perfectly competitive firm.  We have already seen that the
distinction between fixed and variable costs is crucial in terms of debt and equity
financing, but standard models of perfectly competitive firms are incapable of
accommodating fixed costs.  Presence of fixed costs leads to increasing returns in the
production structure.  Profit maximization under increasing returns to scale leads to
the classic problem of indeterminacy of optimal output for a perfectly competitive
firm.
So, in modeling an economy where firms access the equity market to finance
their fixed cost needs, we have to move out of the realm of perfect competition.  A
monopolistically competitive market structure in the lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
is one of the ways to accommodate fixed costs and yet get rid of the indeterminacy
problem.
From a very different viewpoint, Krugman (1998), Diaz-Alexandro (1985) and
others have written extensively on the possible complications that might arise if a
financial reform programme is initiated in an imperfectly competitive product market
environment.  Their emphasis is on the collusive behaviour of the firms and possible
firm-bank tacit understandings.  Obviously the sequencing of the liberalization
process should take this into account.  The general consensus is that product market
liberalization should preceed or go hand-in-hand with a full-fledged financial
liberalization process.  In our model we consider an economy where some reforms in
the product market has already taken place and there are no barriers to entry in the
product market but the market structure still remains monopolistically competitive
because of the presence of fixed costs.4
Only very recently there has been some theoretical work on financing
behaviour of monopolistically competitive firms.  (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
1998, Becsi, Wang and Wynne 1998, Bernanke and Gertler 2000) These models are
not primarily aimed at analyzing financial reforms but look into the dynamics of
simultaneous development of the financial and real sectors.  Here, following Bekaert,
Harvey and Lundblad (2001), we make an important distinction between modeling
financial development and financial liberalization.  They argue in their empirical
study that financial liberalization has a temporal dimension and the liberalization
effect is distinct from the impact of financial development.
 The financial sector, in these models, consists of only traditional financial
intermediaries and firms depend only on debt financing.  Also the structure allows for
monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods (inputs in the production process)
market but not in the final goods market.
Our paper tries to provide a dynamic general equilibrium framework where
the monopolistically competitive sector produces one of the final goods.  The inputs
in the production process are land, labour and capital.  So, we are not looking into
produced inputs but rely on primary inputs.  Also, we present a choice in front of the
firm regarding modes of financing.  In our view, incorporating a source of direct
finance enhances the possibility of analyzing financial reforms at an advanced stage
of reforms process.
Generally, the financial reform programmes undertaken by developing
countries have followed a particular pattern.  Initially the stress is more on moving
from an administered interest rate regime to market determined interest rates.  This
has been accompanied by policies to ensure a competitive environment in the banking
sector - a move away from nationalized banks towards free entry and exit.  On the
other hand, development of the equity market has generally lagged the development
of financial intermediaries in the reforms process.  At a theoretical level, attempts to
capture the real effects of a financial reform programme have mostly concentrated on
the interest rate and banking sector reforms (Kapur 1976, 1980 ; Matheison 1980 and
more recently Edwards and Vegh 1998).  In this paper we conceive of a situation
where interest rates are already market determined and there is perfect competition in5
the banking industry.  We concentrate on a general policy induced efficiency increase
in the functioning of the equity market. In general we are abstracting from policies
which engineer a switch of savings from traditional financial intermediaries to the
equity market, rather our focus will be on policies which increase the efficiency of
transformation of financial savings into productive capital through the equity market.
A typical developing country feature is that not all firms have access to the equity
market.  Our assumption of fixed cost financing through the equity market and a fixed
cost component in the cost structure of the monopolistically competitive firm would
imply that these firms will have access to the equity market.  On the other hand, The
perfectly competitive firms, having only to satisfy their variable cost needs will
depend only on bank finance.  We can think of the perfectly competitive firms as the
smaller ones operating at the fringe of the economy.  The smaller firms are generally
the ones which are excluded from the equity market either through government fiat or
market forces and are unable to reap the benefits of economies of scale.  Later on we
provide a detailed discussion on the kind of market scenario that we have in mind.
Introducing monopolistic competition opens up the interesting question of optimal
product diversity (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977).  Rajan and Zingales (1998) from a cross-
country study of firms conclude that "financial development has almost twice the
economic effect on the growth of the number of establishments as it has on the growth
of the average size of establishments."  Their argument is based on the fact that the
external finance requirement of the new firms will be relatively more pronounced but
the idea has not been formally modeled.  In our model we try to provide a framework
which can explain observed brand proliferation in the process of financial
development.  In short, policy induced efficiency increase in the equity market makes
the fixed cost component easier to obtain and it becomes profitable to venture into
new brands at the margin.  This explanation does not rely on the traditional methods
of relaxing barriers to entry in the product market.  As we have noted, we are
modeling an economy where all the barriers to entry have already been dismantled.
In the course of the paper we also look at some preliminary simulation exercises
based on this structure where alternative parametric specifications are made broadly
keeping in mind some developing country features.  More specifically, we look at
some proxy experiments for financial reforms in the above setup.  These include an
exogenous policy induced efficiency increase in the equity market and a possible
reduction in the reserve requirement.  The capital and labour intensities in the6
production process along with a host of other parameters influence the simulation
results.  The details given in the paper point to a rich structure which can be exploited
to generate many interesting results.
Section 1 of this paper builds up the structure of the model.  Section 1A deals
with the household optimization problem whereas the next section presents the timing
of the decisions and actions of different agents in the system.  Profit maximization
exercises of the firms in the two sectors are detailed in Section 1C.  A rudimentary
structure of the banks are presented in Section 1D.  The last Subsection under Section
1 depicts the different market clearing conditions.  The steady state characterization of
this dynamic structure is done in Section 2 to prepare the model for a comparative
static analysis. While Section 3 discusses alternative plausible parametric
specifications, Section 4 brings out the basic results of the simulation exercises.
Detailed results of the simulations are provided in Appendix I - VI. Section 5
concludes.
Section 1 : The Model
Section 1A : Agent Characterization - Households
We consider a two period overlapping generation structure for the households.
The mass of the households is normalized to one and we do not consider population
growth.  We denote the first period of the household as “young” and the second
period as “old”.
Households are endowed with one unit of labour which they supply
inelastically when young at the market wage rate.  We assume that old people do not
work.  Young households consume a part of the wage and save the rest for
consumption when old.
Household optimal consumption decision is modeled as a multistage process.
In the first stage they decide on how much to consume when young and how much to
save.  In the second period they consume the saving from the first period plus the7
return on these savings.  The consumption decision is taken by a representative
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where δ  is the subjective discount rate,  t V  denotes wage rate and  1 + t d  denotes the
gross return on saving between t and t +1.  Also  t C  is a composite index of different
consumption goods and  t P  is an index of the prices of different goods.  For any
variable a subscript denotes the time when the concerned cohort was born and
superscripts of 1 and 2 denote young and old, respectively.
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In the second stage the household consumer has to allocate each period’s
consumption expenditure between a single homogeneous good and a set of
differentiated goods.  Xtis the quantity index associated with the differentiated good
and the consumption of the homogeneous good is given by  t Y .
The homogeneous good is treated as the numeraire and the price index
associated with the differentiated good is t p .  So, in effect  t P  is the composite index8
of price of the homogeneous good (normalized to unity) and price of the differentiated
good (indexed by t p ).
In the second stage optimization the instantaneous utility function is taken as a Cobb-
Douglas one
α α − = 1
t t t Y X U (5)
Consumers maximize (5) subject to the intra period budget constraints
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The consumers will allocate a constant fraction of the total consumption
expenditure on the differentiated good, where the fraction will be determined by the
marginal utility of the differentiated good.
In the final stage the consumer will decide on the allocation between different
brands of the differentiated good.  We construct the price index  t p  and the quantity
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where  t n  is the number of brands at period t.
The construction of the quantity index additionally captures the feature that
there is no “love of variety” - the number of brands offered to the consumers does not
have any bearing on his overall utility.
The consumer will try to maximize the value of the quantity index by
choosing his allocation over the different brands, subject to the constraint imposed by
the price index.































Here,σ is the elasticity of demand for a particular brand. For horizontally
differentiated goods value of σ  should be close to one but not equal to one.
Under the assumption of symmetry between differentiated goods firms (12) reduces to
t t t x n X = (13)
because  t t jt n j x x . ,......... 1 = ∀ =
Also  t jt t n j p p .. ,......... 1 = ∀ =
Total demand for the differentiated good at any point in time (say t) will be the
demand arising out of the young people born at t plus the demand of the old people
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On the other hand the household also has to make a portfolio allocation
decision.  Given the logarithmic form of the intertemporal utility function a constant
proportion of the labour income will be saved in the young age.






The young household has the option of saving in the form of bank deposits, or
they can invest in the equity market or they can buy land from the old. Banks offer a
riskless gross rate of return  t r  on deposits.  We consider a very primitive kind of an
equity market where secondary market in equity is not developed as yet.  So, the
return from equity does not have a capital gains component.  The firms simply pay
back the amount invested in the equity market along with a dividend, the gross rate or
return on equity being  t d .  Return from land has two components - land earns a rent
t q  from the firms who use it for their production and there might be capital gains
arising out of sale of land when the households are old -  rt rt p p − + 1  . ( rt p denotes
the price of land at period t).
In a general equilibrium if the household wants to save a non trivial amount in
all the assets available to it, then an arbitrage condition should ensure that the return
to all the assets must be equal in equilibrium.
t t
rt










The equilibrium in each of the asset markets will be determined by the
movement of asset prices to achieve the arbitrage condition.
Also, in equilibrium the total amount of saving should be completely invested
in either of the 3 assets.
t t t t B R E S + + = (18)
where,  = t E saving in the equity market
= t R saving in land
= t B saving in bank deposits
Section 1B : Timing structure of the model
Before looking at the specifics of the production side of the model, let us
briefly look at timing of different decisions taken by the households and firms.  On
the production side we have firms in the homogeneous goods industry and in the
differentiated goods industry.  Although households live for two periods, we assume
that firms are infinitely lived and the production structure replicates every period.  At
the beginning of period t firms hire labour and rent land from the old to start the
production process.  The differentiated goods firms also convert last period’s saving
in the equity market into productive physical capital.  The young households receive
wages before the final product is produced and sold in the market.  This payment in
advance constraint forces the firms to borrow from banks their entire wage bill.
When the final output reaches the market, the young households spend a part of their
wage earnings in consuming it.  The proceeds from sales are used by the firms to pay
rent and dividend to the old at t and also to meet their contractual commitment with
the banks.  The unconsumed part of the wages of the young households is used either
to buy land from the old, or saved in the form of bank deposits and equity market
capital.  When young households turn old, their income consists of rent from land
(which they have given on rent when old), dividends on the saving done through
equity market when they were young, interest income from their saving deposits and12
also earnings from selling land to the young.  They spend their entire income on the
final output before they die.
t-1 t+1
Borrow
























Section 1C : Production
Now, we can look at the production side of the economy in greater detail.  The
particular kind of market structure we are modeling can be justified in the following
ways - the homogeneous goods producing sector can be thought of as a generalization
of the “agricultural” sector whereas the differentiated goods sector can be the image
of the overall “industrial” sector.  Otherwise, the homogeneous goods producing
sector can be the fringe (small) firms in a particular industry, whereas the
differentiated goods sector can be the core (large) firms in the same industry.  In
either situation our assumption of lack of access to equity market for the
homogeneous goods sector (and consequently the absence of increasing returns to
scale technology in this sector) seems to be a plausible one.
The homogeneous good is produced under conditions of constant returns to
scale with a Cobb-Douglas technology.  Labour (L) and land (R) are the only two
inputs used in the production of the homogeneous good.  Perfectly competitive market
structure in this sector ensures marginal cost pricing at the optimum.
1 = + t ry t ly q a W a (19)13
where, t t t l V W = (20)
ij a is the requirement of the ith input (i = L , R) in the jth line of production (j = X,
Y). s aij '  in principle can be functions of the wage rental ratio.   t W  denotes the
marginal labour cost taking into account the rate of interest that has to be paid on the
loans taken to finance the wage bill.  t l is the gross lending rate of the banks.  The
marginal cost associated with land is only the rent that has to be paid to the old
people.  Note that marginal cost of the homogeneous good is equated to the price of
the homogeneous good, which is set to unity by suitable normalization.
Each brand of the differentiated good requires a variable cost and a quasi-fixed
cost component in its production structure.  Except for the quasi-fixed cost, output is
produced through a Cobb-Douglas technology.  The introduction of fixed cost paves
the way for increasing returns to scale in this sector.  The variable cost component is
produced using labour and land, whereas the quasi-fixed cost component requires the
usage of labour and physical capital.  The important point to note here is that fixed
costs are generally more capital intensive.  Here quasi-fixed cost is a recurring cost
which has to be incurred every period and it is not in the nature of a sunk cost.  We
assume that level of quasi-fixed cost is insensitive to the level of output but will vary
with the level of input prices.  This kind of a production structure with quasi-fixed
costs has been used by Konishi et al (1990) and Chao and Yu (2001).  The capital that
is part of the quasi-fixed cost is obtained from the equity market.  The differentiated
goods firms have access to a simple linear technology through which saving in equity
market at period t-1 is converted into productive physical capital at period t.
1 − = t t kE K (21)
where,  t K is the amount of productive capital at period t.
The lack of access to this technology may be thought of as the reason for
homogeneous goods firms not accessing the equity market.  The coefficient k  in this14
technology tries to capture the fact that in a not so well developed equity market a
large part of the funds invested in the market might not get converted into productive
capital.  Along with financial reforms and strengthening of the equity market, we
assume that a higher proportion of savings will be converted into productive capital.
An increase in k might also be a proxy for lower capital market imperfection and
hence lower external finance premium.  In principle k can be thought of as any
function and need not be a linear one. Although, savings and physical capital are both
measured in terms of the numeraire good, we are making a conceptual difference
between the two in terms of their applicability in the production process.  We also
assume that capital depreciates completely in the production process and the firms
have to go to the equity market again next period to raise funds for physical capital
formation.
In a monopolistically competitive market structure, free entry within a period
will drive down profits to zero.  The price in the differentiated goods sector will be set
at a markup over the variable cost and the mark up will be a function of the elasticity
of demand for that particular brand.  To ensure zero profits in the long run, the rest of
the revenue (a fraction 
1
ρ ) will go towards covering fixed costs.
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Here the labour coefficient associated with per firm fixed cost is  lf a  and the capital
coefficient associated with it is  kf a .  rx lx a a   and    are the labour and land coefficients
associated with production of the marginal cost for the branded goods firm.  The cost
of the physical capital will be more than the per unit dividend payment on saving in
equity market because by assumption of linear technology in capital goods
production, not all the savings acquired from the capital market is used in the
production process.15
Section 1D : Banks
The problems associated with asymmetric information, agency costs and
optimal contracts have always been in the center-stage of the literature on financial
reforms.  So, the stress has been on the role of banks in the credit disbursement
process.  In this model we abstract from the important role of the banks by assuming a
deterministic production structure.  There is no uncertainty in the production or
consumption process.  Also we have in mind a complete information setup.
Due to the above assumptions banks become passive conduits of channelising
savings from households to firms.  Banks take deposits from households and finance
the wage bill of the firms by lending them the required amount.  While passing
through the banks a part of the savings (µ ) is kept aside by the banks.  This can be
thought of as a proxy for CRR.  It is exogenous to the model and is thought to be part
of a regulatory practice which does not arise out of the incentive structure of the
model.
We assume perfect competition in the banking industry which forces the
profits of the banks down to zero.  For a zero profit intermediary the lending rate will
simply be a mark up over the deposit rate when there is a reserve requirement.  A
higher reserve requirement will force the banks to charge a higher lending rate to the
firms.
t t l d ) 1 ( µ − = (24)
The deposit and lending rate will be determined by the supply of deposits by the
households and the demand for credit by the firms.
Section 1E : Market Clearing
Now, we will look into clearing of different markets in a general equilibrium setup.
First, we look at the labour market where the demand for labour from homogeneous16
goods producers and differentiated goods producers must be equal to the fixed supply
of labour 1 (endowment to the households).
1 = + + t lf t t lx t ly n a x n a Y a (25)
In the market for land, total demand for land arises out of the demand from
homogeneous good producers and from the variable cost of the differentiated goods
sector.  This should be equal to the fixed total supply of land (normalized to one).
1 = + t t rx t ry x n a Y a (26)
In the market for capital the total supply is not fixed. It depends on the saving
in the equity market which is an endogenous variable in the model.  The demand for
capital arises only from the fixed cost component of the differentiated goods
producers.  In equilibrium,
1 − = t t kf kE n a (27)
The equilibrium in the productive capital market highlights the fact that the
supply of funds in this market depends on the equity market efficiency parameter k .
The total demand for funds for working capital financing comes from both the
homogeneous goods producers and the differentiated goods producers because both of
them use labour and face the payment in advance constraint.  This demand for funds
is constrained by the supply of deposits from households and the reserve requirement
of the banks.
t t lf t t t lx t t ly t V n a V x n a V Y a B + + = − ) 1 ( µ (28)
In the market for land, the total saving in land should be equal to its value, i.e.,
market price multiplied by the fixed supply (normalized to be unity).17
1 . rt t p R =  (29)
In the differentiated goods market total supply at period t in terms of the numeraire
good should be  t t t x p n  if we invoke the assumption of symmetric firms.  This should
be equated to the total demand for the differentiated good given by equation (14).








The use of Walras law allows us to get rid of the market clearing condition in
the homogeneous goods market.
Section 2 : Steady State Characterization
Equations (16) - (30) are 15 dynamic equations of the model and represent a
complete dynamic general equilibrium set up.  In this paper we do not look at the
dynamic properties of the system and concentrate only on steady state characteristics
of the dynamic structure.
The steady state versions of the dynamic equations, without time subscripts
represent a complete general equilibrium system.  We claim that a set of positive
values of the variables () q d l p p K n x Y B R E W V S r , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  which solves
equations (16) - (30) is a general equilibrium of the model.  For further analysis, we
simplify the above system by getting rid of some of the variables by suitable
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1 = + nX a Y a rx ry (37)
L n a nX a Y a lf lx ly = + + (38)
nV a nXV a YV a B lf lx ly + + = − ) 1 ( µ (39)
Now, the reduced system of equations comprises of equations (31) - (39).
These are 9 equations in 9 variables  }   and   , , , , , , , { r p B q l Y x p n V .  It is in principle
possible to find the values of the variables which solve this system of equations but
for a non-linear system of equations finding out the steady state will be very difficult.
So we will be more interested in doing some comparative static exercise around the
steady state assuming that for suitable parameter values one such steady state exists.
For the comparative static exercise,we linearize the equations around that steady state
and get the following set of linear equations.19
l r p q ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + − = − µ ϕ (40)
r p B k n V ˆ ) 2 1 1 ( ˆ 2 ) ˆ ˆ ( 1 ˆ λ λ λ λ − − + + − = (41)
0 ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( = − + + q ly l V ly θ θ (42)
p q lx l V lx ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( = − + + θ θ (43)
x p k l kf l V kf ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ )( 1 ( + = − + − + + − µ ϕ θ θ (44)
) )( ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ x rx lx y ry ly q l V x ly n ly Y ly ε θ δ ε θ δ δ δ δ + − + = − + − + (45)
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) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ l V p x n + − + = + + µ ϕ γ (47)
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where,  lx ly θ θ   and    are the cost shares of labour in the homogeneous and differentiated
goods sectors respectively.
θ kf  is the cost share of capital in the quasi-fixed cost.
ry ly δ δ   and    are the physical shares of labour and land in the production of the
homogeneous good.
y x ε ε   and   are the elasticities of substitution in the branded and the homogeneous
goods sectors respectively.
λ  represents a fraction of the total demand for the differentiated good coming from the
old generation.
2 1   and   λ λ  are the proportions of savings in equity market and banks respectively.20
2 1   and   π π are the proportions of bank credit given towards the homogeneous goods








 is a variable which gives us some idea about the initial level of CRR in the
economy.
Let "^" over a particular variable denote the percentage change in that variable.
From the linearized system our object of interest is to study the effect on the different
variables of changes in the parameters of the system.  We specifically focus on the
changes in the policy induced parameters k and l, given the values of structural
parameters  γ ϕ π π λ λ ε ε δ δ θ θ θ and , , , , , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 y x ly ry kf ly lx .
Section 3 : Parametric specification
To find any numerical solution of a comparative static exercise with this
system of equations we will require specific values for the different structural
parameters.  We formulate our parametric specification keeping in mind some of the
developing country features. For some of the structural parameters we chose
alternative values to look at how the system behaves under different initial conditions.
We assume a very simple constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology
structure in both homogeneous and differentiated goods sectors  - 1 = = Y X ε ε .  The
fixed cost production structure is generally more capital intensive than the other
sectors.  kf θ  is assumed to be equal to 0.8. Proportion of saving in land and equity
market will be less than saving in banks for a developing country.  So we set λ 1 = 0.2
and λ 2= 0.5 respectively.  In a developing country context, proportion of bank credit
given to the homogeneous goods industry and for variable cost financing of the
differentiated goods industry will be much higher than what is going towards the
fixed cost of the differentiated goods industry. We assume  5 . 0 and 3 . 0 2 1 = = π π
respectively.  We also assume that physical share of labour in the production of the
homogeneous good is higher than the physical share of land -  δ δ ry ly > . We will see
that this assumption will be helpful in signing the different effects of policy changes
and seems to be a plausible assumption.  We do not specify any particular value for21
the cost shares of labour in homogeneous and differentiated goods industry, but
θ ly and θ lxare likely to take high values.  In our simulation exercise we work with
some particular combinations of θ lyand θ lx.  The initial level of CRR is taken to be
10% before financial liberalization.  This can be justified from most developing
country experiences.  A 10% level of CRR gives a ϕ  value of 0.1.  Finally we assume
that the old people consume more and the young people save more, so that γ  is taken
to be equal to 0.8.
Section 4 : Simulation Results
We should note that we have not specified any particular values for the
parameters  δ δ θ θ ly ry ly lx and , , .  So, in principle the effects of changes in policy
induced parameters will be functions of these structural parameters.
First, we do the comparative static exercise with changes in the efficiency of
the equity market parameter k.  For that we set µ ˆ  to be equal to zero.  Here we will
present results for only 5 important variables - number of brands in the steady state n,
per brand output in the steady state X, level of homogeneous good in the steady state
Y, relative price of the differentiated good p and the rent on land q. Detailed results on
other variables are given in the appendix.
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The above solutions have the general form
k b u ˆ ˆ =
where u ˆ  is the percentage change in the steady state value of the relevant endogenous
variable measured by multiplying the impact effect b with the percentage change in
the policy instrument k.  At this stage we will be more interested in the sign of b
(impact effect) for different variables and see how these impact effects are related to
δ δ θ θ ly ry ly lx and , , .  The important features of the solutions are
As long as  δ δ ry ly >  (one of our parametric specifications) and δ ly  is large ( 5 . 0 > δ ly
is a sufficient condition), the denominator of b (same for all the variables) is going to
be positive.  Since δ ly  measures the share of labour force engaged in the traditional
primary sector, this seems to be a plausible assumption for developing countries.
The numerator of the impact effect on the number of brands (n) will also be
positive under the above parametric specifications.  The impact effect can be positive
even when  δ δ ry ly < , if δ ly  and δ ry are both large.  So for most plausible values of
δ δ θ θ ly ry ly lx and , , , an increase in the efficiency of the equity market will lead to an
increase in the number of brands.
On similar lines the numerator of the impact effect on the per brand output (x)
is likely to be negative given  δ δ ry ly >  and δ ly  and δ ry are large.  An increase in the
efficiency of the equity market will lead to a fall in the per brand output.
The numerator of the impact effect on the output of the homogeneous good
(Y) cannot be signed unambiguously.   δ δ ry ly >  is not a sufficient condition for this
to be either positive or negative.  So the impact effect of an efficiency increase in the
equity market on the homogeneous good output can go either way, in principle.
The numerator of the impact effect on the relative price of the differentiated
good (p) will depend on both the difference in physical shares  ) ( δ δ ry ly−  and the
difference in cost shares  ) ( θ θ ly lx− .  So relative price can move in either direction
following an efficiency increase depending on the structural parameters.23
The numerator of the impact effect on the rent on land will be positive given
δ δ ry ly > .  So rent on land is likely to go up after an increase in efficiency of the
equity market.
Now, we do the same kind of exercise with the CRR parameter l.  The
analysis assumes k ˆ to be equal to zero.  Unfortunately we cannot make general
remarks about the results of a decrease in CRR, as we have done in case of increase in
the efficiency of the equity market.  The results depend on  δ δ θ θ ly ry ly lx and , , i n  a
much more complicated manner.  (start from here)We derive the impact effects for
some plausible alternative values of  δ δ θ θ ly ry ly lx and , ,  and present the detailed
results in a tabular form in Appendix IV - VI.
Some general reflections are in order -
A decrease in CRR generally leads to an increase in the number of brands.
Per brand output in the differentiated goods industry generally falls following a
decrease in CRR.
The impact effect of a decrease in CRR on homogeneous good output is generally
negative.
The effect on the relative price of the homogeneous and the differentiated good
depend on the difference between the labour cost shares  ) ( θ θ ly lx−  assuming
δ δ ry ly > . Relative prices can move in either direction.
A decrease in CRR will generally be followed by an increase in the rent on land under
the assumption that  δ δ ry ly > .
Since financial liberalization is characterized by a fall in the CRR and an
increase in the efficiency of the equity market, it is clear from the simulation results
that the  endogenous variables - number of firms, per brand output and the output of
the homogeneous good - will move in the same direction following the initiation of a
complete reforms package. So the two components of financial liberalization will
reinforce each other.24
Finally we put some plausible values for  δ δ θ θ ly ry ly lx and , ,  and try to
quantify the actual effect of a one percent change in the efficiency of the equity
market parameter k and the CRR parameter l. The exact percent changes in the
different variables are reported in the tables in Appendix I - VI. In the Appendix we
also we also present the impact effects by changing the share of savings in equity
market ) ( 1 λ  and the capital cost share  ) ( kf θ . Although the exact numerical results
are only indicative in nature, we can put forward some general remarks about the
quantitative aspects of the model.
The impact effects of the emergence of new firms and fall in per brand output
is significantly large under all possible scenarios.
Effect on the homogeneous good production is always small. When we reduce
the capital cost share  ) ( kf θ , the two types of financial reforms might have different
impact on the homogeneous good production. (Appendix - III & VI)
Relative prices and rent on land are not responding significantly to any
financial reforms in this set up.
After the reforms wage rates and lending rates are moving in the opposite
directions. Although in most cases wage rates go down, it might go up following an
increase in the efficiency of the equity market when the capital cost share  ) ( kf θ  is
low. (Appendix -III)
The effect of a change in CRR on per brand output and number of firms is
similar when we allow for an increase in the share of savings in the equity market.
The effect of an increase in the efficiency of the equity market on these variables do
differ significantly under alternative specifications of initial share of savings in equity
market. (Appendix -II & V)25
A change in the capital cost share changes the impact effect on steady state per
brand output and number of firms significantly for both types of reforms
measures.(Appendix -III & VI)
Section 5 : Conclusion
This paper tries to address the problems of carrying on a financial reform
package from a developing country perspective, which has already undergone some
amount of interest rate liberalization. In the general equilibrium structure we model
the savings behaviour of a continuum of overlapping generations of households. They
are the sole provider of finance to the firms, but the financing operates either through
perfectly competitive financial intermediaries or through a primitive equity market.
We have constructed a market structure where we can take into account differences in
production technologies and access to finance for different sectors. There is a
homogeneous good which is produced through a constant returns to scale production
technology, whereas, the other one is a differentiated good produced via an increasing
returns to scale technology. Equity market access is limited to the differentiated goods
firms.
Financial reforms package in our model consists of an increase in the
efficiency of the equity market in converting savings into productive capital and a
lowering of the cash reserve ratio of the financial intermediaries. The complex
structure of our model does not allow for unambiguous analytical solutions to these
comparative static exercises. The effects of these changes generally depends on a host
of parameter values. We try to characterize the effects for some plausible alternative
parametric specifications.
Although the exact numerical values of the effects on different endogenous
variables are always questionable because of the simplistic structure of the financial
intermediaries and the equity market and uncertainty about the correct parametric
specification, we get a clear idea of the direction of change. Our results lend
theoretical support to the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1998) that emergence of
new firms and financial development are closely related. We also find that the size of
the firms tend to get reduced following financial reforms. This seems to project a26
picture of brand proliferation and reduction in concentration in the differentiated
goods industry as a consequence of financial liberalization and not as a consequence
of lifting of barriers to entry.
We are yet to look at the welfare consequences of this exercise formally, but
because of the sensitivity of our results to alternative parametric specifications, we
can say that financial liberalization will not be an unmixed blessing under all
circumstances.  We intend to carry forward this analysis in an open economy context,
where liberalization of capital flows can act as another possible reform measure.27
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Appendix - I
5 . 0 , 2 . 0 2 1 = = λ λ
The effect of 1% increase




nXY V p q L
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.53 -0.58 0.03 -0.27 0.003 -0.008 0.28
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.56 -0.6 0.02 -0.24 0.004 -0.01 0.25
5 . 0 1 = y θ
7 . 0 1 = x θ
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.54 -0.59 0.01 -0.26 0.002 -0.006 0.26
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.52 -0.57 0.03 -0.27 -0.003 -0.01 0.28
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.55 -0.59 0.01 -0.25 -0.004 -0.01 0.25
y 1 θ  = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.5
y 1 δ  = 0.9
  ry δ  = 0.7
0.54 -0.59 0.009 -0.26 -0.002 -0.008 0.26
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.54 -0.59 0.03 -0.26 0.003 -0.01 0.27
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.56 -0.61 0.01 -0.23 0.004 -0.01 0.24
y 1 θ  = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.9
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.55 -0.60 0.009 -0.25 0.002 -0.008 0.25
  y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.53 -0.58 0.02 -0.27 -0.003 -0.01 0.27
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.56 -0.60 0.007 -0.24 -0.004 -0.02 0.24
y 1 θ  = 0.9
x 1 θ  = 0.7
  y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.54 -0.59 0.007 -0.25 -0.002 -0.01 0.2631
Appendix – II
5 . 0 , 3 . 0 2 1 = = λ λ
Effect of increase in k by




nXY V p Q L
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ = 0.5
0.66 -0.69 0.02 -0.14 0.002 -0.004 0.14
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.67 -0.69 0.009 -0.13 0.002 -0.006 0.13
y 1 θ  = 0.5
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.67 -0.69 0.006 -0.13 0.001 -0.003 0.13
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.66 0.68 0.01 -0.14 -0.002 -0.006 0.14
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.67 -0.69 0.006 -0.13 -0.002 -0.008 0.13
y 1 θ  = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.5
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.67 -0.69 0.005 -0.13 -0.001 -0.004 0.13
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.66 -0.69 0.01 -0.14 0.001 -0.005 0.14
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.67 -0.70 0.006 -0.12 0.002 -0.008 0.13
y 1 θ  = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.9
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.67 -0.69 0.005 -0.13 0.001 -0.004 0.13
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.66 -0.69 0.01 -0.14 -0.001 -0.007 0.14
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.67 -0.69 0.004 -0.13 -0.002 -0.01 0.13
y 1 θ  = 0.9
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.67 -0.69 0.003 -0.13 -0.001 -0.005 0.1332
Appendix – III
6 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 2 . 0 2 1 = = = kf θ λ λ
The effect of 1% increase




nX Y V p q L
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ = 0.5
0.78 -0.74 -0.03 0.22 -0.003 0.007 -0.23
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.75 -0.72 -0.01 0.22 -0.003 0.007 -0.23
y 1 θ   = 0.5
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.77 -0.73 -0.009 0.21 -0.002 0.005 -0.21
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.79 -0.74 -0.02 0.23 0.003 0.009 -0.23
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.76 -0.73 -0.01 0.20 0.004 0.01 -0.20
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.5
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.77 -0.73 -0.008 0.21 0.002 0.007 -0.21
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.77 -0.73 -0.02 0.22 -0.002 0.009 -0.22
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.74 -0.71 -0.009 0.18 -0.003 0.01 -0.18
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.9
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.76 -0.72 -0.007 0.20 -0.001 0.006 -0.20
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
0.78 -0.74 -0.02 0.22 0.002 0.01 -0.22
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
0.75 -0.72 -0.006 0.19 0.003 0.01 -0.19
y 1 θ = 0.9
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
0.77 -0.72 -0.005 0.21 0.002 0.008 -0.2133
Appendix – IV
5 . 0 , 2 . 0 2 1 = = λ λ
Effect of increase in CRR





y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.62 0.49 0.08 -0.70 0.008 -0.02 0.72
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.55 0.44 0.04 -0.63 0.01 -0.03 0.66
y 1 θ = 0.5
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.59 0.46 0.03 -0.67 0.006 -0.01 0.68
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.63 0.51 0.07 -0.71 -0.008 -0.03 0.72
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.57 0.46 0.03 -0.64 -0.01 -0.04 0.66
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ   = 0.5
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.60 0.47 0.02 -0.67 -0.006 -0.02 0.68
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.60 0.47 0.07 -0.68 0.008 -0.03 0.69
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.53 0.41 0.03 -0.61 0.01 -0.04 0.63
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ   = 0.9
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.58 0.45 0.02 -0.66 0.006 -0.02 0.66
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.61 0.49 0.06 -0.69 -0.008 -0.03 0.70
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.54 0.44 0.02 -0.62 -0.01 -0.05 0.63
y 1 θ = 0.9
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.58 0.46 0.02 -0.66 -0.006 -0.03 0.6734
Appendix – V
5 . 0 , 3 . 0 2 1 = = λ λ
The effect of 1% increase
in CRR on the different
variables under alternative
parametric specifications.
nXY V p Q l
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.63 0.50 0.08 -0.71 0.008 0.02 0.73
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.57 0.46 0.04 -0.65 0.01 -0.03 0.68
y 1 θ = 0.5
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.59 0.47 0.03 -0.67 0.006 -0.01 0.69
y 1 δ = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.65 0.52 0.07 -0.72 -0.008 -0.03 0.74
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.59 0.48 0.03 -0.67 -0.01 -0.04 0.68
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.5
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.60 0.48 0.02 -0.68 -0.006 -0.02 0.69
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.62 0.48 0.07 -0.69 0.008 -0.03 0.71
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.55 0.43 0.03 -0.63 0.01 -0.04 0.65 y 1 θ  = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.9
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.58 0.45 0.02 -0.66 0.006 -0.02 0.67
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ = 0.5
-0.63 0.50 0.06 -0.71 -0.008 -0.04 0.71
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.57 0.45 0.02 -0.65 -0.01 -0.05 0.65
y 1 θ  = 0.9
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.59 0.46 0.02 -0.67 -0.006 -0.03 0.6735
Appendix - VI
6 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 2 . 0 2 1 = = = kf θ λ λ
Effect of 1% increase in




nxY V Pq L
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.83 0.62 0.13 -1.10 0.01 -0.03 1.13
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.69 0.52 0.06 -0.93 0.02 -0.04 0.97
y 1 θ = 0.5
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.76 0.57 0.05 -1.02 0.009 -0.02 1.04
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.85 0.65 0.12 -1.13 -0.01 -0.05 1.15
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.72 0.56 0.05 -0.96 -0.02 -0.06 0.99
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ  = 0.5
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.78 0.59 0.04 -1.04 -0.009 -0.03 1.06
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.79 0.58 0.11 -1.06 0.01 -0.04 1.08
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.65 0.48 0.04 -0.89 0.02 -0.06 0.91
y 1 θ = 0.7
x 1 θ   = 0.9
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.74 0.54 0.03 -0.99 0.009 -0.03 1.01
y 1 δ  = 0.7
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.81 0.61 0.10 -1.09 -0.01 -0.06 1.10
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.5
-0.68 0.52 0.03 -0.92 -0.02 -0.07 0.93
y 1 θ = 0.9
x 1 θ  = 0.7
y 1 δ  = 0.9
ry δ  = 0.7
-0.75 0.56 0.03 -1.01 -0.009 -0.04 1.02